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Abstract
In an environment with asymmetric information and intragenerational externalities, the im-
plementation of a ﬁrst-best eﬃcient Clarke–Groves–Vickrey mechanism may not be feasible if
it has to be self-ﬁnancing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deﬁcit can be
covered in every generation only if the initial allocation is not dynamically eﬃcient. While
introducing a pay-as-you-go scheme without addressing the externality already yields a Pareto
improvement, further welfare gains can be captured by using the additional resources to
achieve a perfect internalization.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we show that making use of intergenerational transfers can be necessary
and suﬃcient to achieve a Pareto improvement if otherwise non-internalizable in-
tragenerational externalities exist. In order to generate intragenerational externalities
that are not a consequence of an ad-hoc restriction of the set of admissible mechan-
isms, we use an environment with asymmetric information. For this class of prob-
lems, the realization of intragenerational gains from trade – or, what is the same, the
internalization of intragenerational externalities – is not trivial because mechanisms
cannot be directly contingent on the information parameters of the problem. Our
argument that intergenerational transfers can improve the allocation is based on the
relaxation of participation constraints that hold if a generation tries to implement a
potentially Pareto-improving mechanism. Although it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd externalities
that have no intergenerational component in practice, a number of externalities in
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production and consumption mostly aﬀect adults in their working age. It is therefore
worthwhile to analyze the limiting case in which intergenerational components do not
exist.
To be more speciﬁc, suppose that individuals can take actions that aﬀect – through
some arbitrary channel – the wellbeing of other individuals in the same generation.
While the actions are observable, the types that may, for example, determine the
psychic and monetary costs associated with these actions are private information.
The most prominent application for such problems can be found on insurance mar-
kets, which may be partitioned by birth cohorts to generate purely intragenerational
externalities. Purchasing insurance is then generally associated with externalities for
the other insured in that contract. Consequently, ﬁrst-best full insurance contracts
will be oﬀered in the market equilibrium only for some individuals (Dionne and
Doherty, 1992). In such a situation, there is scope for attaining ﬁrst-best allocations
through a Pareto-improving mechanism that entails subsidization of high-risk types.
As another example, take the determination of public and private preventive and
curative care in case of an infectious disease. Let that disease be dangerous only for
the elderly, say some type of inﬂuenza. Any treatment has positive externalities within
that generation, but not across generations because the next generation will have
to combat new viruses. The problem of the government is now to determine the
aggregate willingness to pay for the measures through some Clarke–Groves or
d’Aspremont–Ge´rard–Varet mechanism.
A government tries to implement a mechanism that induces every individual to
take an action that yields in combination an eﬃcient allocation. However, the im-
plementation of a mechanism has to ensure that everybody is at least as well oﬀ as in a
reference allocation without this mechanism. This requirement does not create a
problem if individuals are suﬃciently similar. With eﬃciency gains approximately
equally distributed, everybody is willing to pay a lump sum that ﬁnances the incentive
payments of a direct mechanism. Having a more diﬀerentiated population often
implies a situation in which some individuals have a rather low willingness to pay for
achieving a proposed eﬃcient allocation. In the asymmetric-information framework,
these individuals cannot be identiﬁed ex ante and compensated accordingly. Con-
sequently, some types earn information rents, and the maximum lump sum that can
be collected may not cover the expenses for the incentive payments in full. As a result,
the transfer mechanism is not feasible if it has to be self-ﬁnancing. A minimum period
deﬁcit (MPD) arises to be able to internalize intragenerational externalities.
Intergenerational transfers from the young to the old can close the gap between
necessary expenses and the maximum revenue that can be collected without harming
anyone in the old generation. This can take the form of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
pension entitlement for the old being contingent on actions taken during their
working life, a ﬂat pension beneﬁt, or public debt in general. However, the problem to
ﬁnance the MPD of the mechanism arises again for the young who – depending on
the link between MPD and population size – may or may not face the same structure
of intragenerational externalities as in the predecessor generation and who, in
addition, have to be compensated for the transfer they have given to the old. It turns
out that an intergenerational Pareto optimum can be achieved at a debt per capita
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converging to zero if and only if the population growth rate exceeds both the interest
rate and the growth rate of the MPD.
Our contribution adds a new argument to the literature dealing with the Pareto-
improving role of intergenerational transfers. Our ﬁnding that the transfer scheme is
sustainable if and only if the growth rate of the economy exceeds both the interest rate
and the MPD growth rate is important in two respects.
1. It shows that even if the MPD turns negative when the population reaches a
critical size, the ability to achieve an intergenerational Pareto improvement is up
to the dynamic ineﬃciency of the economy. This ﬁnding points to a substantial
conﬂict of interest : consider a structure of the intragenerational externality
such that intragenerational eﬃciency is feasible without additional transfers
from a critical population size on, where the economy is dynamically eﬃcient.
Intergenerational transfers may then transform a Pareto ineﬃcient intertemporal
economy into a Pareto eﬃcient one, but this transformation is no intergenera-
tional Pareto improvement.
2. It shows that in all cases where the interest rate falls short of the growth rate of
the MPD, a Pareto-improving introduction of a PAYG scheme that allows the
implementation of a ﬁrst-best mechanism is even more diﬃcult to achieve than
what may be perceived from the literature. In this case the relevant comparison is
not between population growth rate and interest rate, but between population- and
MPD-growth rate.
By the same token, our contribution may be seen as turning around an
argument from the debate on Pareto improvements by abolishing a PAYG
scheme being ﬁnanced by distortionary taxation (Breyer, 1989; Homburg, 1990;
Fenge, 1995; Brunner, 1996). Gains for each generation may be realized by getting rid
of static ineﬃciencies that would not exist without the PAYG scheme. This
view overlooks that the static ineﬃciencies may arise when the PAYG scheme
is abolished. The literature so far still lacks a convincing argument for the existence
of static ineﬃciencies of PAYG schemes that are not consequences of ad-hoc re-
strictions. It rather starts with an ad-hoc ineﬃciency of the PAYG scheme that cannot
be justiﬁed within the model. Hence, the conclusion that the replacement of an inef-
ﬁcient PAYG system by an eﬃcient-funded system creates an eﬃciency gain is
true but misleading, because it would have been possible to reform the PAYG system
in a way as to remove the static ineﬃciency in the ﬁrst place. Conversely, in
our framework it is the introduction of the PAYG scheme that enables the
economy to remove static externalities that may result from asymmetric
information. Hence, if an undistorted economy exhibits static ineﬃciencies because
of informational asymmetries, abolishing a PAYG scheme may create static
ineﬃciencies that could otherwise be internalized. We consider asymmetric infor-
mation as a natural starting point for explaining persistent static ineﬃciencies
and borrow from the literature on mechanism design (e.g. Makowski and Mezzetti,
1994).
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The literature has put forward four lines of argument to show that intergenera-
tional transfers may be necessary to Pareto-improve the allocation of an inter-
temporal economy.
The ﬁrst argument is based on the dynamic ineﬃciency of an overlapping-
generations economy if individual preferences for old-age consumption are suﬃ-
ciently strong. High rates of private savings may imply a capital stock that is too high.
Channelling savings away from the capital market is thus a means to make every
generation better oﬀ (Samuelson, 1958; Diamond, 1965).
Second, in an economy with exogenous interest rate intergenerational transfers
play the role of a chain letter. As long as some type of transversality condition is not
violated and no last period exists, intergenerational transfers can make every gener-
ation better oﬀ (Spremann, 1984).
Third, Merton (1983) argues that if the risks on capital and labor markets are not
perfectly and positively correlated, it may be useful to introduce some element of
PAYG ﬁnanced intergenerational redistribution in order to eﬃciently hedge risks.
Fourth, intergenerational externalities, for example in the form of human capital
investments between parents and children (Peters, 1995; Kolmar, 1997; Sinn, 2000),
in the form of technological externalities because of increasing returns to scale
(Wigger, 2001), or in the form of the exploitation of a non-renewable resource create
a suﬃcient argument in favor of intergenerational transfers. In each case inter-
generational gains from trade exist. These gains can be captured by implementing a
scheme in which the older generation receives a PAYG pension as a compensation for
sacriﬁcing consumption opportunities during the working period in favor of the
younger generation. Intergenerational transfers are necessary to achieve a Pareto
improvement because the generation that has to make the sacriﬁce would inevitably
be worse oﬀ if it changed its incentive scheme as to internalize the externality without
transfers.
Our argument can be perceived as an alternative to the justiﬁcations related to
hedging and intergenerational externalities as these need not hold at the same time.
In contrast, it turns out that intergenerational Pareto improvements are possible
only if dynamic ineﬃciency prevails. Thus, the internalization of intragenerational
externalities through PAYG schemes is complementary to the arguments of over-
coming dynamic ineﬃciencies and using chain letters.
Apart from these eﬃciency considerations, the emergence of PAYG schemes can
be rationalized by an equity argument. If the currently old generation is compara-
tively poor, its lot can be improved by redistribution from the young to the old so as
to maximize a Rawlsian or utilitarian intertemporal welfare function. Similar in spirit
is the concept to use PAYG schemes as a device for intergenerational risk-sharing
(Gordon and Varian, 1988; Shiller, 1999). Finally, following Browning (1975), it has
been argued that PAYG schemes are likely to be founded, extended and sustained in
the political process because old workers and retirees will either get a pension without
paying contributions or exhibit a high rate of return on their remaining future con-
tributions.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we intro-
duce the basic model of intragenerational externalities in an economy characterized
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by intertemporally segregated generations and a structure of asymmetric
information. Section 3 describes the set of Pareto-eﬃcient allocations and ﬁrst-
best mechanisms that induce one of these allocations. Subsequently, Section 4
discusses participation constraints and presents a necessary and suﬃcient con-
dition under which a self-ﬁnancing ﬁrst-best mechanism is no longer feasible. Section
5 analyzes the issue of sustainability when both intragenerational and intergenera-
tional transfers are used to achieve a ﬁrst-best allocation, and the ﬁnal Section 6
concludes.
2 The model
We consider a discrete time model in which we have a sequence t=1, … of periods. In
every period of time there lives a number mt of individuals, constituting generation t.
Our assumption that generations do not overlap should not be taken literally. It
represents a reduced form of a standard overlapping-generations framework in which
no intergenerational spillovers exist except for potential transfers. This convention is
used in order to keep the notation as simple as possible. Focusing on intragenera-
tional externalities, we stress that choices of individuals do not aﬀect previous
or succeeding generations. In an extension, we borrow from the standard overlap-
ping-generations model the property of possible transfers from younger to older
generations. In every period t, an individual i=1, … , mt is characterized by her type
hi
tsHit  R. This type is her private information. Denote by ht the vector of realized
types hti , . . . , h
t
mt
 
, being an element of the set of potential type proﬁles
Ht=Ht1r . . .rH
t
mt . For convenience, we assume that the type determines the utility
function of an individual, U(.,hi
t). The probability distribution governing nature’s
choice of types Yt(ht) is common knowledge, and individual draws are statistically
independent.
Every individual can choose an action ai
t from a set of possible actions Ai
t. The
vector of actions is denoted by at={at1, . . . , a
t
mt}, and A
t=At1r . . .rA
t
mt is the col-
lection of action sets in period t. The utility of an individual depends both on the
choices of all individuals in her generation, at, and on a transfer bi
tsR, bt={bt1, . . . ,
btmt} 2 Bt=Rm
t
of a storable private good. The utility function of an individual is
given by
U(at, bti , h
t
i)=v(a
t, hti)+b
t
i , i=1, . . . ,m
t: (1)
In accordance with the literature on mechanism design, the utility function is
assumed to be additively separable between at and bi
t and linear in the latter argu-
ment. The ﬁrst component v will be called action utility. It fulﬁlls the single-crossing
property,
v(ati , a
t
xi,hˆ
t
i)xv( a
t
i , a
t
xi,hˆ
t
i )>v(a
t
i , a
t
xi,
~h
t
i )xv( a
t
i , a
t
xi,
~h
t
i ), hˆti > ~h
t
i ^ atil ati , (2)
which generates convenient monotonicity properties (Milgrom, 2004).
This formulation of an allocation problem allows for a very general structure of
spillovers and types of goods that are traded within the economy. Virtually any type
of intragenerational interdependency between individual actions and utilities can be
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interpreted as a special case of the above speciﬁcation, ranging from perfectly rival to
perfectly non-rival goods.
In our basic setup, we abstain from intergenerational transfers. This implies that
the transfer budget must be balanced in every period:
;
mt
i=1
bti=0, t=1, . . . : (3)
In the following we analyze the case that generations are intertemporally separated.
This means that the choices made by members of generation t have no impact on the
economic environment or the number of individuals in period t+1 or any other
future period. In addition, we assume that intergenerational transfers are absent
in the initial situation prior to the implementation of an eﬃcient mechanism.
In this reference allocation, individual i in period t achieves a utility level of
Ui
M(ht), where the vector of reservation utilities in period t is denoted by
UM(ht)={UM1 (h
t), . . . ,UMmt(h
t)}. This initial situation can have various interpreta-
tions. In a positive interpretation of the model, it can range from anarchy to a pri-
vate-property economy, or any form of a more explicit institutional structure that
generates a potentially ineﬃcient outcome. In a normative contractarian interpret-
ation of the model, it can be a situation of ideal equality under a veil of ignorance
(Rawls, 1971). Irrespective of the precise interpretation of this initial situation, it
leads to a vector of reservation utilities for every individual in each generation. This
vector speciﬁes a minimum acceptance point for every individual in the sense that
every allocation that generates a lower level of utility can be blocked.
To summarize, an economy is characterized by {mt, U, UM, Ht, At, Bt}t=1, ….
3 Pareto-eﬃcient allocations and direct mechanisms
We start by a characterization of Pareto-eﬃcient allocations. First note that the set of
Pareto-eﬃcient allocations can be found by the maximization of the unweighted sum
of utilities because of the assumption of quasi-linear utilities. The case of inter-
temporally separated generations is particularly easy to solve because the inter-
temporal optimum {at, bt}t=1, … can be derived by the separate solution of each
period’s optimal policy {at, bt} for the case of symmetric information.
Recalling the budget equation (3), any ﬁrst-best eﬃcient allocation for every period
t has to satisfy
max
a(ht), b(ht)
;
mt
i=1
v(a(ht), hti)+b
t
i(h
t)
 
=max
a(ht)
;
mt
i=1
v(a(ht),hti): (4)
In general, the optimal choice of at will be a function of ht because otherwise the
type would be irrelevant. Denote by at*=at*(ht) such an optimal solution and by
P(ht) the maximum sum of utilities. The linear terms b*(ht) are indeterminate within a
certain range and will be used to control incentives.
We are looking for conditions under which intergenerational redistribution is
necessary and suﬃcient for a Pareto improvement. It is therefore necessary to assume
that every generation chooses an institutional structure that is as eﬃcient as possible,
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given that no transfers between generations occur. Any argument in favor of inter-
generational redistribution that is not based on an inevitable friction of the in-
tratemporal problem is ad hoc in the sense that a better organization of the
intratemporal allocation problem would be an alternative to intertemporal redistri-
bution.
In order to implement at* the society can use a period-t mechanism Mt={St, f}
that assigns strategy sets St={St1, . . . ,S
t
mt} to every individual i=1, …, m
t in period t
and a mapping f :StpAtrBt that selects a choice vector at for any given vector of
strategies st. We call an allocation (at, bt) Bayesian implementable if it is a
Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of the game induced by mechanism Mt.
We know from standard implementation theory that every choice vector at
that can be implemented by an arbitrary mechanism can also be implemented by
a direct mechanism Md
t={Ht,(at*(.),bt*(.))} (Mas-Colell et al. 1995). Because we
want to focus on the role of intergenerational transfers under ideal institutional
structures we will therefore restrict our attention to optimal direct mechanisms in the
following.
Our analysis follows the approach of Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) who in con-
trast to most of their predecessors ﬁrst look at conditions under which the incentive
compatibility constraints are fulﬁlled and then analyze the participation constraints.
This way of dealing with the problem is analytically easy to handle and is more
adequate to our problem than the alternative approach to assume that the partici-
pation constraints are fulﬁlled and then check for the incentive compatibility con-
straints. We will ﬁrst characterize the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient direct mechanism. In the next
section, we investigate the conditions under which a Pareto-improving implemen-
tation of this mechanism is or is not possible. The latter case deﬁnes necessary con-
ditions for the Pareto-improving role of intergenerational transfers. In order to
complete our argument in favor of intergenerational transfers, we ﬁnally have to
characterize conditions under which a scheme of intra- and intergenerational trans-
fers is also sustainable.
Denote by Et[.] the non-contingent expected value and by Ei
t[.] the contingent ex-
pected value of [.] for a given type hi
t, i=1, …, mt. A Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of
the direct mechanism Md
t is a vector of strategies ht such that
Eti [U(a
t(ht), bti(h
t),h ti)] o E
t
i [U(a
t(hˆ
t
i , h
t
xi), b
t
i(hˆ
t
i , h
t
xi), h
t
i)]
8 hˆti2Hti 8 i=1, . . . ,mt:
(5)
It is now straightforward to characterize the properties of an eﬃcient direct mech-
anism. In order to implement at*(ht), individuals need to have an incentive to reveal
their true type hi
t.
Lemma 1. Any eﬃcient direct mechanism involves a transfer rule obeying
bti(hˆ
t
i , h
t
xi)=E
t ;
jli
v(at*(hˆ
t
i , h
t
xi),h
t
j)
" #
+cti , i=1, . . .m
t, (6)
where ci
t is a constant.
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Proof. See Appendix A. %
Lemma 1 states that the transfer is equal to the sum of the expected action utilities
of all other individuals plus a constant. This rule ensures that everybody acts so as to
maximize the sum of all expected utilities.
4 Feasibility without intergenerational transfers
Without intergenerational transfers the budget constraint ;m
t
i=1 b
t
i=0 has to be
fulﬁlled. In order to ﬁnd out whether the ﬁrst-best mechanism is feasible without
relying on external resources, we have to check if the constant terms ct can be
chosen so as to balance the budget. Denote by Dt(ct) the expected deﬁcit of the
eﬃcient mechanism with constant terms ct. If ct1= . . .=c
t
mt=0, the expected deﬁcit is
equal to
D(0) :¼ (mtx1)Et[P(ht)]=(mtx1) Et ;
mt
i=1
v(at*(ht),hti)
" #
: (7)
Hence, an eﬃcient mechanism can be implemented without intergenerational trans-
fers if and only if the sum of constant terms ct, multiplied byx1, is not smaller than
D(0), where the boundary is determined by
;
mt
i=1
bi= ;
mt
i=1
Et ;
jli
v(at*(hˆ
t
i , h
t
xi), h
t
j)
" #
+cti
 !
=(mtx1)Et ;
mt
i=1
v(at*(ht),hti)
" #
+ ;
mt
i=1
cti=0:
(8)
Assume that the reservation utility of individual i in the case that the mechanism is
not implemented is equal to Ui
M(ht). The precise speciﬁcation of this reservation
utility depends on the status quo alternative that is used as a benchmark for the
evaluation of the implementation of an eﬃcient mechanism, as being discussed in
Section 2. Since the qualitative nature of our argument does not rely on the numerical
values of the Ui
M(ht), we do not have to specify the economic environment that gen-
erates them. However, we will analyze the allocation of a private good in a private-
property economy as an example in Section 6. The assumption of private property
will then generate an explicit value of the reservation utilities.
Given this framework, Proposition 1 describes the necessary and suﬃcient con-
dition for being able to implement a ﬁrst-best allocation without intergenerational
transfers.
Proposition 1. If and only if D(0)fx;m
t
i=1 M
t
i with
Mti :¼ max
hti2Hti
Eti [U
M
i (h
t)]xEti ;
mt
j=1
v(at*(hˆ
t
j , h
t
xj), h
t
j)
" #( )
holds in every period, it is possible to implement an intertemporally eﬃcient allocation
without intergenerational transfers.
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Proof. See Appendix B. %
Proposition 1 indicates under which condition intergenerational transfers may be
useful to achieve a Pareto improvement. Note that the threshold values Mi
t will ty-
pically be negative if the sum of the expected action utilities is positive, and vice versa.
The proof of Proposition 1 shows that the lump-sum payments that can be
imposed on an individual are restricted from above. If the condition stated in
Proposition 1 is violated, it is no longer possible to arrive at a ﬁrst-best allocation
by means of a self-ﬁnancing mechanism. Of course, this does not exclude a Pareto
improvement compared to the reference allocation through some other self-ﬁnancing
mechanism.
The feasibility problem is in fact a result of asymmetric information. The next
proposition demonstrates that in a world with symmetric information the ﬁrst-best
allocation can be achieved without intergenerational transfers.
Proposition 2. With symmetric information implementing a ﬁrst-best allocation is
feasible without relying on intergenerational transfers.
Proof. See Appendix C. %
Proposition 2 is easily understood. If information about the individuals’ types is
symmetrically distributed, diﬀerentiated lump-sum payments can be used. It is then
possible to design the transfer structure such that everybody gets exactly her reser-
vation utility while the ﬁrst-best action vector is induced. Such a scheme will be
associated with a budget surplus because internalizing the externalities at a balanced
budget must lead to a higher sum of expected utilities. The arising budget surplus can
then be distributed to make everybody better oﬀ. With asymmetric information,
many individuals may receive unavoidable information rents if a mechanism is im-
plemented in order to achieve a ﬁrst-best allocation. As a result, the gain in aggregate
utility may not be suﬃcient to ﬁnance these rents.
5 Sustainability with intergenerational transfers
We know from the above analysis that a ﬁrst-best eﬃcient allocation can be reached
only if the transfer rule (6) is fulﬁlled in all periods. Recalling that Lemma 1 describes
the set of eﬃcient direct mechanisms, the question as to whether it is actually possible
to implement a ﬁrst-best eﬃcient allocation is answered by ﬁnding out if ct can be set
such that an intra-generationally Pareto eﬃcient mechanism is self-ﬁnancing, i.e., the
condition outlined in Proposition 1 is fulﬁlled. Depending on the structure of the
intragenerational allocation problem, this condition may or may not be fulﬁlled if
information is asymmetrically distributed. If the gains from trade from the im-
plementation of an eﬃcient mechanism are suﬃciently large for all realizations of
types ht, we can expect that the implementation of an eﬃcient mechanism is in fact a
Pareto improvement. However, it is easy to construct examples where this condition
is not satisﬁed. For example, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have shown that it is
impossible to reach eﬃciency in a situation of bilateral trade with private property
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rights if gains from trade exist in expectation, but not for every realization of types. If
such a situation occurs, intergenerational transfers may play a Pareto-improving role.
In order to demonstrate this, let
W(ht,mt, at,UM)=D(0)+ ;
mt
i=1
Mti (9)
be the minimum period deﬁcit (MPD) necessary to implement a ﬁrst-best
eﬃcient allocation in generation t. In general, W
t
depends on the nature of
the allocation problem, the preferences of the individuals, and the size of the popu-
lation.
In the following we extend our basic model of intertemporally separated genera-
tions by allowing for transfers from any younger generation t+1 to its predecessor
generation t. This can be done by simply reinterpreting (1) as representing the indirect
utility function of the standard overlapping-generations (OLG) model where the in-
dividual has already optimized her savings behavior. A storage technology exists such
that the interest rate is zero, where resources can be added up across periods.
Transfers do not alter production in the economy, and we exclude the option to invest
budget surpluses in order to generate some additional output in the next period. Later
on, we also consider the possibility of a ﬁxed positive interest rate, corresponding to a
standard OLG model of a small open economy.
Given that every generation t+1 pays a transfer W(ht) to its predecessor gener-
ation, the budget constraint (3) of a generation t becomes
;
mt
i=1
bti+W(h
tx1)xW(ht)=0: (10)
Intergenerational transfers can hence make it possible to implement an eﬃcient
allocation for all generations t if and only if
W(ht)fW(ht)xW(htx1), t=1, . . . : (11)
Neglecting the asymptotic behavior of W(.) such a transfer scheme is possible to
implement in principle (see Spremann, 1984). The problem is to construct a scheme
which is sustainable. For a ﬁnite time horizon, a ﬁrst-best mechanism is called sus-
tainable if it is possible to cover all budget deﬁcits. If we have an inﬁnite time horizon,
the corresponding condition is that public debt per capita converges to zero. Our
notion of sustainability is of course very narrow. It is also conceivable to call a
scheme sustainable if debt per capita does not exceed a ﬁnite threshold or even if the
ratio between public debt and GDP does not exceed some ﬁnite number. However,
neither alternative is a generalization of the requirement in the ﬁnite horizon frame-
work that all debt has to be repaid.
Assume that the intergenerational transfer mechanism is ﬁrst to be implemented
in period t=1 and that a transfer W1 is ﬁrst paid to generation 1 by generation 2.
We can easily derive the necessary and suﬃcient condition for being able to im-
plement a ﬁrst-best mechanism when the economy ceases to exist at the end of
period T.
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Proposition 3. For every ﬁnite time horizon T a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for the implementation of a ﬁrst-best mechanism in every period is that the sequence of
transfers {Wt}t=1, ...,T={;
t
i=1
W
i
}t=1, ...,T satisﬁes ;
T
i=1
W
if0.
Proof. See Appendix D. %
Proposition 3 states that deﬁcits in some periods have to be at least compensated by
surpluses in other periods. Otherwise, it is impossible to cover every budget deﬁcit
that arises between the ﬁrst period t=1 and the last period T. Given that the nature of
the allocation problem and the preferences of the individuals do not change over
time, this condition can only be fulﬁlled if there is either positive or negative popu-
lation growth. With a constant population size and W
t
>0 for some t, the deﬁcit W
t
is
constant and positive in all periods. In Appendix G, we will present an example of an
economy with only private goods in which W
t
decreases in mt. The following cor-
ollary is an immediate implication of Proposition 3.
Corollary. There exists no Pareto-improving introduction of a sequence of transfers
{Wt}t=1, ...,T={;ti=1 W
i
}t=1, ...,T with W
tl0 for at least one t that implements a ﬁrst-
best mechanism in every period.
Proof. See Appendix E. %
With a ﬁnite time horizon it is impossible to make every individual in each gener-
ation better oﬀ by introducing intergenerational transfers. While a Pareto-eﬃcient
allocation may be achieved by implementing the scheme of intra- and intergenera-
tional transfers, a generation that is a net payer can even do better in the absence of
the intergenerational transfer scheme. In that case it can implement a ﬁrst-best allo-
cation for its members and leave the full period budget surplus for their consumption.
Even if it is possible to eliminate all ineﬃciencies over time, it is not possible to do so
in a Pareto-improving way.
Next we focus on an inﬁnite time horizon. The gross intergenerational transfer in
the receiving generation is w(ht)=W(ht)/mt per capita. We start by considering
the situation in which the population grows at a constant rate m=mt+1/mtx1 8 t
and the minimum deﬁcit W grows at a constant rate g 8 t, depending on the exact
nature of the allocation problem. Further, we introduce the interest rate ro0.
Proposition 4 collects the conditions under which debt per capita converges to zero.
Proposition 4. With an inﬁnite time horizon and constant growth rates of the popu-
lation and the period budget deﬁcit, implementing a ﬁrst-best mechanism in every period
is sustainable if and only if the rate of population growth, m, is higher than the maximum
of the interest rate and the growth rate of the deﬁcit, g, that is, m>max{g, r}.
Proof. See Appendix F. %
Since aggregate debt increases steadily irrespective of the growth rate of the deﬁcit,
a positive rate of population growth is necessary for having a debt per capita that
converges to zero. Per assumption, the minimum debt of the current budget deﬁcit
Intragenerational externalities and intergenerational transfers 541
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474721200011X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 14:08:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
grows at rate g, while debt related to all earlier budget deﬁcits grows at the interest
rate r. Therefore, aggregate debt as the sum over such components never grows at a
rate that is higher than max {g, r}. As the limiting cases may occur, debt per capita
converges to zero if and only if m>max{g, r}, that is, population grows at an even
higher rate.
The condition m>r states that dynamic ineﬃciency is necessary for sustainability of
the intergenerational transfer scheme. This property can be related to the justiﬁcation
for PAYG schemes by a dynamic ineﬃciency of the economy, that is m>r in a situ-
ation without PAYG transfers. The case g>m>r is worthwhile exploring: the econ-
omy is in a state of dynamic ineﬃciency, but the growth rate of the MPD exceeds the
population growth rate. In this case, there is no Pareto-improving PAYG scheme that
allows the implementation of ﬁrst-best mechanisms in all periods and that is con-
sistent with the transversality condition that debt per capita converges to zero. Hence,
it turns out the standard criterion for the existence of Pareto-improving PAYG
schemes is misleading if one takes into consideration that static ineﬃciencies may be
an unavoidable and systematic attribute of the economy under consideration. It must
be replaced by the stronger condition m>max{g, r}.
Propositions 3 and 4 have some obvious implications for the more general sce-
narios without constant growth rates. For example, if the growth rate of the popu-
lation is always positive and higher than the growth rate of the aggregate deﬁcit, debt
per capita will converge to zero. In contrast, if the population does never increase and
the budget deﬁcit is always positive, the intergenerational transfer scheme is not
sustainable.
Of course, W
t
is in general a function of the population size, W
t= W(mt). Whether
W rises or falls with an increasing population depends on the nature of the problem.
In the bargaining problem presented in Appendix G, W decreases with a rising
population because a hold-up problem vanishes as the size of the market increases. In
contrast, we expect an increasing deﬁcit for any conventional public goods provision
problem because the probability that a voter’s misrepresentation of preferences is
decisive becomes small. Following this reasoning, Mailath and Postlewaite (1990)
have shown that an eﬃcient public good provision will not take place with a self-
ﬁnancing mechanism when the population becomes large. It is conceivable that this
may even yield a scenario in which the period deﬁcit grows faster than the population
for any population growth path with positive growth rates. Thus, dynamic inef-
ﬁciency of the economy is not suﬃcient to implement a sustainable scheme of inter-
generational transfers that removes the static ineﬃciencies in all periods.
We can draw some additional conclusions by recalling Propositions 3 and 4. Debt
per capita will converge to zero if population increases at a minimum growth rate
mmin>r while at the same time the function W is non-increasing. With an increasing
function W, the intergenerational transfer scheme is sustainable if in every period the
rate of population growth exceeds both the interest rate and the growth rate of the
deﬁcit. Further, a shrinking population may go along with a sustainable scheme if we
have budget surpluses for small populations and budget deﬁcits for large populations.
If the deﬁcit is positive for all population sizes, a constant or shrinking population
can never imply that debt per capita converges to zero.
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6 Concluding discussion
We have demonstrated that implementing a ﬁrst-best allocation in an environment
with asymmetric information and only intragenerational externalities can require the
use of intergenerational transfers. Since the self-ﬁnancing constraint of the mechan-
ism cannot be satisﬁed, additional funds are needed. These funds are provided by the
succeeding generation, which can be achieved by setting up a PAYG pension scheme.
Of course, if an alternative source for receiving the additional government revenue is
available as, for example, borrowing from abroad, the problem may also be solved
without making use of PAYG pensions or some similar arrangement. However, if
government borrowing on a perfect capital market is considered, it should be noted
that the debt will never be repaid by the generation that receives the beneﬁts.
Otherwise, future tax payments will be taken into account such that the additional
funds today do not contribute to relax the participation constraints. If future gen-
erations have to pay back the internal or external public debt, the transfer scheme is
virtually identical to a PAYG pension scheme. A sustainable scheme with a per-
capita debt converging to zero and budget deﬁcits in every period requires that the
initial inter-temporal allocation is not dynamically eﬃcient. Hence, achieving a ﬁrst-
best allocation in every period is possible only if an intergenerational Pareto im-
provement can already be realized by introducing the PAYG scheme without tackling
the externality problem. Our argument states that additional welfare gains can then
be captured by having the necessary additional resources to implement a ﬁrst-best
allocation in every period.
Noting that all major OECD economies tend to be dynamically eﬃcient (Abel
et al., 1989) suggests that our results show the impossibility of a sustainable scheme of
intergenerational transfers if budget deﬁcits occur in every period. Such a conclusion
may be premature, however. In particular, the vast majority of the observations cited
in Abel et al. refer to economies in which PAYG pension schemes are already in
place. As both the introduction and extension of a PAYG pension scheme decrease
aggregate savings, it cannot be excluded that dynamic ineﬃciency would prevail in a
counterfactual situation without intergenerational transfers. For example, let the
minimum period deﬁcit be stationary, the population growth rate lie at 1%, and the
real interest rate at 2%. Such an observation suggests that a sustainable inter-
generational Pareto improvement is not feasible. However, this turns out to be wrong
if the interest rate without the PAYG scheme lies around 0.5%. On the other hand,
the secular trend of aging through lower fertility is expected to imply lower growth
rates in the long run, making it even less likely to achieve an intergenerational Pareto
improvement.
The proposed scheme can also work in a shrinking economy, which may be char-
acterized by a negative population growth rate. An eﬃcient allocation in all periods
can, for example, be achieved when we have budget surpluses in smaller economies.
With budget surpluses in some periods, at least one generation of net contributors
can improve its position by abolishing the transfer scheme. When the notion of
sustainability is relaxed by allowing for some ﬁnite per-capita debt in the limit or a
positive maximum debt–output ratio, a growing population may no longer be
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necessary for a sustainable scheme with budget deﬁcits in every period. If we allow for
growing labor productivity, a constant or even declining population can go along
with an increasing aggregate output over time.
If the proposed scheme is not sustainable, using some resources from intergenera-
tional transfers will generally harm at least one of the succeeding generations.
However, the typical situation in practice will be that achieving a ﬁrst-best allocation
in one generation involves some elements of intergenerational spillover in the sense
that it enlarges the production capacities in the next generation. As already stated at
the outset, such a component of intergenerational spillover would already necessitate
intergenerational transfers.
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Appendix A – Proof of Lemma 1
Compare the condition for an eﬃcient allocation (4) with the individual condition for
rational behavior in a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium, (5). Recalling the utility function
(1) then shows that both problems coincide if and only if bt fulﬁlls (6). With this
transfer the individual maximization problem reads:
max
hˆ
t
i2Hti
Eti v(a
t*(hˆ
t
i , h
t
xi), h
t
i)+ ;
jli
v(at(hˆ
t
i , h
t
xi), h
t
j)
" #
+cti , i=1, . . . ,m
t: (A:1)
For every individual i=1, …, mt, the maximum of this function is at hˆ
t
i=h
t
i by con-
struction. It can easily be veriﬁed that the class of eﬃcient mechanisms is un-
ambiguously determined except for the constant terms ci
t (see D’Aspremont and
Ge´rard-Varet, 1979).
Appendix B – Proof of Proposition 1
The implementation of an eﬃcient mechanismMd
t is Pareto-improving if and only if
Eti ;
mt
j=1
v(at*(hˆ
t
j , h
t
j),h
t
j)
" #
+ctioE
t
i [U
M
i (h
t)], i=1, . . . ,mt: (B:1)
Noting that ci
t cannot be contingent on hi
t because of the asymmetry of information,
this condition has to be fulﬁlled for all possible realizations of the type, implying that :
ctioM
t
i :¼ max
hti2Hti
Eti [U
M
i (h
t)]xEti ;
mt
j=1
v(at*(hˆ
t
j , h
t
xj), h
t
j)
" #( )
, (B:2)
which deﬁnes a participation constraint for individual i in period t. Hence, only if
D(ct)=D(0)+ ;
mt
i=1
ctif0 , D(0)fx ;
mt
i=1
ctifx ;
mt
i=1
Mti (B:3)
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holds, it is possible to implement an eﬃcient mechanism without intergenerational
transfers.
Appendix C – Proof of Proposition 2
With symmetric information, type-contingent transfers ci
t can be used. The threshold
levels are given by
ctioM
t
i :¼ Eti UMi (ht)
 
xEti ;
mt
j=1
v(at*(hˆ
t
j , h
t
xj), h
t
j)
" #
: (C:1)
Implementing a ﬁrst-best allocation without intergenerational transfers is feasible if
D(0)=(mtx1)Et ;
mt
j=1
v(at*(hˆ
t
j , h
t
xj), h
t
j)
" #
f ;
mt
j=1
Eti(U
M
i (h
t)x ;
mt
j=1
v(at*(hˆ
t
j , h
t
xj), h
t
j))=x ;
mt
i=1
Mti ,
which is equivalent to
;
mt
j=1
Eit v(a
t*(hˆ
t
j , h
t
xj), h
t
j)
h i
o ;
mt
j=1
Eit U
M
i (h
t)
 
:
This latter condition is always satisﬁed with strict inequality because gains from the
coordination of actions exist.
Appendix D – Proof of Proposition 3
According to (11), the minimum intergenerational transfer suﬃcient to implement an
eﬃcient mechanism for all generations 1, …, t is equal to
Wt= ;
t
i=1
W
i
:
Noticing this condition, the claim is an immediate consequence of the deﬁnition of a
sustainable scheme.
Appendix E – Proof of Corollary
Every minimum deﬁcit W
t
>0 in an arbitrary period t has to be covered by a sub-
sequence of surpluses W
t
<0, t{1, …, T}. In these periods t it would have been
possible to implement an eﬃcient mechanism without any transfers. Hence, any
transfer W
t
<0 reduces consumption in period t, which implies that at least one
individual is worse oﬀ compared to the status quo.
Appendix F – Proof of Proposition 4
With a constant population growth rate, population at time t is equal to
mt=(1+m)tx1m1. When Wt+1 = Wtx1=g is the growth rate of the minimum period
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deﬁcit, the aggregate minimum debt at time t can be expressed as
Wt= W1;ti=1 1+rð Þtxi (1+g)ix1. Hence, debt per capita in period t can be written as
wt=
W
1
m1
(1+g)tx(1+r)t½ 
(1+m)tx1 gxr½  (F:1)
if glr, and wt=(t W1 (1+r)t)=(m1(1+m)tx1) if g=r. The claim then follows
immediately from considering limtpOw
t.
Appendix G – Example with private goods
We assume that a private (that means rival and excludable) good is traded
and that private property exists, which determines the reservation utility of each
individual.
Assume that at every point of time t there is a potential seller of an indivisible
unit of a private good, called individual 1. This individual has with probability
1/2 a utility of consuming her good that is equal to 1, and with probability 1/2
a utility of consuming her good that is equal to 0. There are mtx1o1 potential
buyers of the good with utilities of a or (1+a), as(0, 1), and probabilities 1/2,
1/2 respectively. The utilities represent types, and the random draws are inde-
pendent of each other. Each individual learns her type before trade takes place,
but not the types of the other individuals. Denote by ai
ts{0, 1}, ;i=2, ...,mt atif1,
the act of trading the good with individual i at t. Normalizing the utility in case
of no consumption to zero, this implies a utility before transfers of
v(at, ht1)= 1x ;
i=2, ...,mt
ati
 !
ht1 (G:1)
for individual 1, and
v(at, hti)=a
t
ih
t
i (G:2)
for individuals i=2, …, mt.
As in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), the problem is to implement a mechanism
that induces every individual to reveal her type and at the same time satisfy the
governments’ budget constraint. Intuitively, the mechanism has to avoid a scenario in
which agents are not willing to engage in mutually beneﬁcial trade. This may happen
if they can rationally expect to get better terms by not agreeing to the proposed price
and continuing the bargaining process. An eﬃcient mechanism implies an ex-post
surplus of max{h1
t, …, hm
t }. Given this surplus the expected deﬁcit of an un-
compensated Clarke-Groves-Vickrey mechanism is equal to
Dt(0)=(mtx1)E[max {h1, . . . , htm}]=(m
tx1)
2m
t
x2
 
(1+a)+1+a
2m
t
=(mtx1)
2m
t
x1
 
(1+a)
2m
t :
(G:3)
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The maximum transfer Mi
t that individual i is willing to accept without generating a
conﬂict with its participation constraint is equal to
Mt1= max
h12{0, 1}
ht1xE
t
1[ max {h
t
1, h
t
2, . . . , h
t
m}]
 
=1xEt1[ max {1, h
t
2 . . . , h
t
m}]
=1x
1
2m
tx1x
2m
tx1x1
2m
tx1 (1+a)
(G:4)
for individual 1, and
Mti= max
hi2{a, 1+a}
0xEti [ max {h
t
1, . . . , h
t
m}]
 
=xEti [ max {h
t
1, . . . , a, . . . , h
t
m}]
=x
2m
tx1x2
 
(1+a)+1+a
2m
tx1 =x
2m
tx1x1
2m
tx1 (1+a)
(G:5)
for individuals i=2, …, mt. Hence, the intergenerational net transfer that is necessary
to balance the budget is equal to
W(ht)=Dt(0)+ ;
mt
i=1
Mti
=(mtx1)
2m
t
x1
2m
t (1+a)+ 1x
1
2m
tx1x
2m
tx1x1
2m
tx1 (1+a)
 
x(mtx1)
2m
tx1x1
2m
tx1 (1+a)
 
=1x21xm
t
+2xm
t
(2m
t
x1)(1+a)(mtx1)
x21xm
t
(2x1+m
t
x1)(1+a)mt:
(G:6)
It is straightforward to check that the sign of this condition depends on a as well as on
mt. The locus W(ht)=0 is given by a monotonically decreasing and convex function
a(mt), with a<a(mt) implying that W(ht)>0. Two results from the literature emerge
as special cases. First, for mt=2 we get W(ht)=(1xa)=4>0. This is the famous
impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) who were the ﬁrst to show
that bilateral trade is necessarily ineﬃcient for small groups of traders. Second, for
mtpO we get limmtpO W(ht)=xa<0, which replicates the result by Gresik and
Sattherthwaite (1989), who have shown that the ineﬃciency vanishes if the number of
potential traders increases. Hence, there is no need for intergenerational transfers in
our example if the economy is suﬃciently large.
On the other hand, if a<a(mt) holds, balancing the budget is only possible by
means of intergenerational transfers. However, in a growing economy, mt+1>mt 8 t,
with a zero interest rate it is always possible to ﬁnd a non-exploding scheme. Noting
that mt+1omt+1 in this case, the range in which a>a(mt) is valid will be reached in
ﬁnite time. Therefore, there exists an intergenerational transfer scheme from the
young to the old that allows the implementation of a Pareto-eﬃcient mechanism in
every period t if T is suﬃciently large. If TpO a Pareto-improving transfer scheme
always exists.
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